This paper considers why a patent-holder would have low incentives to reduce the uncertainty of patent boundary. Clearer patent rights, i.e., when the patent office examination results are more informative about subsequent court decisions, will provide better guidance to technology-specific investment and encourage technology adoption.
Introduction
Uncertainty clouds the patent system (Lemley and Shapiro, 2005) . When preparing for the patent application, an inventor cannot be sure whether she will be granted the patent protection. 1 After filing the application, a lengthy bargaining with the patent examiner renders uncertain both the time to complete a patent office decision and the allowed claims should a patent be issued (Gans et al., 2007) . And even after issuance, it is extremely difficult for anyone, including the patent-holder, to know for sure whether the patent is valid and what exactly is the technology territory it covers (Jaffe and Lerner, 2004; Meurer and Bessen, 2008) . This paper concerns uncertainty of the last sort, i.e., uncertainty surrounding patent scope or patent boundary. Because of the exclusive power attached to a valid and infringed patent, lingering uncertain patent boundary causes serious concerns. It may hinder technology progress, as downstream technology users and future inventors along the chain of cumulative innovation process may find it too difficult to survive in the "patent thicket" and prefer not to use new inventions without clearing the patent "mine field" (Shapiro, 2001; Jaffe and Lerner, 2004) . Indeed, some scholars even suggest that under current situation patents do not deserve to be called intellectual property rights because they fail to provide the important "public notice" function that any meaningful property entitlement should deliver (Risch, 2007; Meurer and Bessen, 2008) . That is, an issued patent does not convey very precise information about the technology boundary of the patented invention, and it is very difficult to evaluate whether a patent would be infringed by simply reading its claims, which are supposed to delineate the patent coverage on the technology space.
This uncertainty may come from several sources. Technological features may cause scientific knowledge in some fields (e.g. software) more difficult to be codified into written records than others (e.g. chemistry and pharmaceutical industry). Agency problem within the patent office may contaminate the "quality" of its decision, and so the informativeness of an issued patent. In this paper, we consider private incentives.
We examine a patent applicant's willingness, or unwillingness, to help reduce the uncertainty associated with her future patent rights, and its impact on technology adoption by the other party. The patent applicant, either as the inventor of the technology or 1 Ayres and Klemperer (1999) suggests using uncertainty as a policy instrument, i.e., granting the owner of a valid patent the exclusive power with probability smaller than one in order to reduce the monopoly loss associated with patent rights. a party closely related to the inventor, should possess relevant knowledge about the patentability issues and technological features of the invention. Furthermore, in most jurisdictions patent examination has the ex parte feature, i.e., it is administered as a bargaining process between the inventor/patent applicant and patent examiner. For these reasons, the patent applicant is a natural candidate one would turn to when seeking private efforts to reduce uncertainty.
Although the probabilistic nature of patent rights has been introduced into the economic analysis in the past decade, 2 previous studies are mostly concerned with the infringement or validity probability at the litigation stage, where patent disputes are ultimately resolved, without addressing the patent examination stage. This perhaps reflects a by and large neglected role played by the patent office in the literature. In this paper, we join some recent efforts to fill this gap and include patent examination as a possible way to mitigate uncertainty. 3 To the best of our knowledge, the discussion about "fuzzy" patent rights and the lack of public notice function is mostly provided by law school professors. Their efforts, nevertheless, are more directed toward whether certain legal rules should be enacted or abolished to alleviate this problem. 4 In this paper, we take one step back and investigate why a patent applicant may lack incentives to help reduce the uncertainty associated with her patent rights. Understanding one important source of the problem, in our view, is a necessary step toward finding solutions.
In Section 2, we introduce a two-player model with an inventor/patent applicant/patentholder and a developer/technology-adopter. The developer wishes to incorporate a new technology into his investment project. After adoption, he has to exert an nonobservable, technology-specific investment effort (hold-up) . Using the new technology, however, will expose the developer to the risk of infringing on the inventor's patent rights. The inventor's patent boundary is resolved in a two-stage process. The patent office first issues its opinion on whether the patent scope is broad enough to cover the new technology, and the court has the final say. The patent office decision serves as a signal about the court judgement. The patent-holder, as the one of the players (if not the only one) most familiar with her invention, can exert some refinement effort to help the patent examiner make a decision more in line with the future court judgement should a patent dispute arise. One key assumption is that when deciding whether to use the new technology, the developer observes the refinement effort chosen by the inventor. Technology adoption therefore depends on the expectation of how informative the patent office decision will be concerning later infringement judgement of the court.
In Section 3 we show that the technology-specific effort, and thus hold-up concerns, will induce the developer's adoption payoff to be decreasing and convex in infringement probability, or patent power. More informative patent office decisions better guide the developer's investment decision in the presence of infringement risk, and increase the developer's payoff from adopting the new technology. In other words, reducing uncertainty encourages technology adoption.
More informativeness, however, also implies that the developer's investment will respond more to the patent office decision. For instance, suppose that ex ante the developer believes that with probability 1/2 the court will find infringement, and consider two extreme cases. If the patent office decision is uninformative at all, then whatever the examination outcome the developer will make an investment decision according to this probability; investment level is not affected by the patent office decision. But if patent examination predicts perfectly the court ruling, i.e., the two actually make the same decision, then according to the patent office decision the developer will make an investment either as if there is no infringement risk (when the patent office issues a narrow patent indicating no infringement), or as if infringement will happen for sure (when the patent office issues a broad patent indicating infringement).
A more diverse investment adjustment may not be in the patent-holder's interest.
Indeed, even when risk neutrality is imposed, we get a fairly mild condition under which the patent-holder's payoff, when the developer adopts the technology, is concave in infringement probability. 5 Given adoption, to reduce the magnitude of investment adjustment, the patent-holder prefers less informative patent office decisions and fuzzier patent rights, The opposite preferences on the informativeness of patent decisions suggest that the inventor's incentives to clarify the patent rights are driven by her interests in promoting technology adoption. No private refinement efforts will be exerted when the inventor wants to monopolize the use of the new technology; she will choose the lowest possible refinement level in order to discourage technology diffusion. And even when, say, the inventor intends to extract some licensing payment from the developer, she still has no incentives to engage in refinement as long as adoption is guaranteed, or will happen with significant probability. The second scenario applies for a patent-holder with a sufficiently low ex ante quality invention, i.e., without information from the patent office examination the patent is very unlikely to be held valid in court, because in this case hold-up is less a threat and the developer will have high probability to adopt the new technology.
In Section 4, we consider whether licensing can solve the hold-up problem and
how it affects refinement incentives. 6 It turns out that if licensing takes place early enough, especially if a license is negotiated before the patent applicant makes refinement decision, it can perfectly substitute for refinement efforts without jeopardizing technology diffusion. This implies that if we rely on early licensing to alleviate the hold-up problem, then fuzzy patents are the side effect we have to live with.
Before concluding the paper in Section 6, we extend the analysis to a simple multiple patent-holder case in Section 5. For simplicity, we consider two symmetric patentholders, and ignore earlier licensing opportunities. We first show that even when the two patent-holders' technologies exhibit some degree of complementarity, as long as each has stand-alone value, technological synergy (i.e., the additional value generated by combining the two technologies) by itself cannot guarantee that the developer will use both technologies. Refinement efforts from both patentees are also required. And under the extreme cases where the two technologies are either perfect complements or perfect substitutes, we show that refinement efforts tend to be strategic complements.
In spite of its restrictive assumptions, this result suggests that it may be worthwhile to design an incentive scheme to encourage some, if not all, patent-holders to exert refinement efforts, for it will have a snowballing effect to increase the overall refinement level.
6 Gans et al. (2007) empirically tests the impact of uncertainty on the timing of patent licensing. They found that the likelihood of licensing increases after the patent office decision and thus uncertainty is reduced. In this paper, however, we do not consider the players' optimal timing to licensing.
Model
In the basic model, we consider the simplest case of one patent-holder/inventor (she) and one developer/technology adopter (he). The inventor seeks patent protection for her invention, and is granted a patent with uncertain boundary covering a technology field. The developer wishes to develop a product in order to enter the downstream market related to that field.
To successfully build a product, the developer has to incur an "entry fee," or a technology adoption cost c f ≥ 0 to learn the fundamental knowledge of the field.
Based on the knowledge he acquired, the developer exerts a technology-specific effort, or the investment effort e ∈ [0, 1], at a private cost c E (e). This effort is referred to as the probability that the developer successfully commercializes a product in the downstream market. It may be technological in nature, such as the successful development of a new functionality; or a pure marketing strategy, such as the advertisement expense; or both, such as the efforts exerted in finding a profitable new product design in a market niche.
Assume that c E (e) and c ′ E (e) ≥ 0, c ′′ E (e) > 0, and c ′′′ E (e) ≥ 0, ∀e ∈ [0, 1]. Also assume that c E (0) = c ′ E (0) = 0, and c ′ E (1) is large enough to guarantee interior solutions. The investment effort is the developer's private information (moral hazard).
We also assume that the adoption cost c f is only known to the developer (adverse selection). The inventor holds a belief that c f is distributed on [0, ∞), with F (·) as the CDF . For simplicity, we will assume that F (·) is continuously differentiable and F ′ (c f ) > 0 over the relevant range. To gain more insights, in several accounts we will consider the special case of quadratic investment cost, c E (e) = e 2 /2K, and uniform distribution for c f , i.e., F (c f ) = νc f for c f ∈ [0, 1/ν], with both K and ν strictly positive and small enough. We assume that the developer will adopt the technology if and only if his expected adoption return is strictly higher than the cost c f .
A successfully built product may fall into the inventor's patent claims. The resolution of patent boundary consists of two steps: patent office examination a P and court verdict a C . Both authorities take binary decisions, a P and a C ∈ {0, 1}. When a P = 1, the patent office issues a favorable decision supporting the inventor's claim over the new technology; and if a P = 0, the patent-holder's claim is not approved by the patent office. 7 Similarly, when a C = 1 (a C = 0) the court upholds (strikes down, respectively) 7 Thus the patent office examination outcomes can have a broader interpretation than simply issuance or rejection. When a P = 0, a patent can be granted, but an important claim in the original application has been trimmed by the examiner. the patent-holder's rights over the technology under dispute.
For simplicity, let the court be the final decision-maker. That is, the patent-holder or technology adopter can appeal the patent office decision a P to the court, but the issue is fully settled with the court ruling. If the court upholds her rights, the patentholder is granted the injunction power; otherwise the technology adopter can freely use the technology. Assume away any legal or management cost to obtain either decisions.
Denote α ∈ (0, 1) as the common ex ante belief that the court will uphold the inventor's rights, α = P r(a C = 1). This probability measures the general strength of the patent protection, or the inventor's technological contribution in terms of patent law requirement. In the following we shall refer to it as the invention quality.
The decision of patent office a P provides some information about the final resolution of patent boundary a C . The informativeness of patent office decision, however, is affected by the inventor's "refinement effort" r. This effort includes any actions from the inventor to help the patent examination result more predictive of a C . For instance, the inventor can search and disclose prior arts to the patent examiner, communicate with the examiner to help the latter better understand the invention, and more carefully draft the patent application (including patent claims and specifications) etc. (Meurer and Nard, 2005; Risch, 2007) .
Formally, assume that P r(a P = a C ) = r ∈ [r, 1], for both a P = a C ∈ {0, 1}.
With probability r the patent office will make the same decision as the court. We assume that the minimal possible refinement effort r is strictly greater than but sufficiently close to 1/2. This minimal level r may come from the patent examiner's effort or the degree to which the court will defer to the patent office decision. 8 Exerting an effort r entails a cost c R , with c R and c ′ R ≥ 0, c ′′ R > 0, c R (r) = c ′ R (r) = 0, and c ′ R (1) = ∞. We will also assume that c ′′ R is large enough to "force" the concavity of patent-holder's payoff function when deciding the optimal refinement effort. For simplicity we will assume that the effort r chosen by the inventor is observable to the developer. For instance, the patent application and examination record is made public after certain period of application (generally 18 months), and via these documents third parties can roughly figure out the "quality" of patent application and thus patent office decisions.
We discuss the case of unobservable private refinement effort in Remark 3 in the end of Section 3.
Contrary to Meurer and Bessen (2006) , where a higher refinement effort is assumed to always improve the patent-holder's prospect in court, in our model refinement's impact is symmetric. 9 Higher refinement effort will increase the predictive power of the patent office decision both when a P = 0 and 1, i.e., whether the inventor receives a favorable patent office decision. As a justification, current U.S. patent prosecution procedure does not require an applicant to conduct prior art search, but does impose "a duty of candor and good faith" (Rule 56), which obliges the disclosure of any information known to the application that may be material to patentability issues. Its violation may render a patent unenforceable. Hence an applicant may have questionable incentives to exert r and search prior arts, and may be even more hesitant to lie and hide gathered information.
Given r and α, the probability distribution of the patent office decision is P r(a P = 1|α, r) ≡ q = αr + (1 − α)(1 − r), and
By observing α and r, after patent office decision, the technology adopter updates his beliefs about the court decision:
We shall also refer to these updated beliefs as "patent power," for they measures the probability of infringing an issued patent. It is easy to verify that when r = 1/2, α 0 =α 1 = α, the patent office decision is totally uninformative; and ∀r > 1/2, α 0 < α <α 1 , and
A higher refinement effort will increase (decrease) the patent power when thee patent office sides with (against, respectively) the inventor.
Referring to Figure 1 , the timing of the game is as follows:
• At time 1 the patent-holder exerts an observable refinement effort r;
9 One way to reconcile the assumption in Meurer and Bessen (2006) and our model is to assume that the game ends after the patent office issues a decision a P = 0. For instance, the patent office rejects the patent application and there is no further appeal by the applicant. • at time 1.5, after learning r but before the patent office decision is known, the developer learns the value of adoption cost c f and decides whether to enter into the field;
• at time 2, the patent office issues its decision a P ∈ {0, 1};
• at time 2.5, after adopting the new technology, the developer makes technologyspecific investment effort e; and
• at time 3, if provoked, the court makes a final decision a C ∈ {0, 1}.
The key assumption here is that the technology adoption decision is made before the patent office decision. This scenario captures a common situation in high-tech, fast-moving industries where important decisions, such as which technologies to be incorporated into a standard or which standard to adopt for product development,
to name a few, have to be made in the clouds of future patent disputes and cannot wait for the lengthy patent examination to reduce (but may not fully eliminate) the uncertainty. By contrast, the investment effort is exerted after the patent office decision in order to keep the hold-up element. As stated above, this effort may capture more than technological choices. For our purpose, the key point is that the developer can make some adjustment according to the patent office decision. (In Appendix B, we show that our main results hold if the adoption decision is delayed to time 2.5, after learning the patent office decision.)
Concerning payoffs, we assume that the patent-holder, as a pioneering inventor, may already operate in the downstream market, and needs not make any further investment.
Her payoff, however, may be affected by the entry of the developer. If the developer doesn't incur the technology adoption cost, the inventor receives a revenue u 10 ≥ 0 and the developer receives zero; this pair of revenues also applies when the developer spends c f and adopts the new technology, but fails to develop a product and so cannot enter the downstream market, which happens with probability 1 − e. On the other hand, with probability e the developer successfully conducts the investment project and can be present in the market. In this case, the revenues accrued to each player are determined by the prevailing market participation profile. Denote u ij and v ji as the patent-holder's and the developer's revenues, respectively, where i = 1 (j = 1) means that the patent-holder (the developer, respectively) is operating on the market; and when i = 0 (j = 0), she (he, respectively) exits the market. Assume there is no exit cost, and Assumption 1. For all i, j ∈ {0, 1}, u 1j and v 1i ≥ 0, u 0j = v 0i = 0, and v 11 > 0.
That is, revenues from downstream market operation are non-negative, and is zero upon exit. Define π ≡ max ij u ij +v ji ∈ {u 10 , v 10 , u 11 +v 11 } as the maximal joint revenue from the downstream market. When π ∈ {u 10 , v 10 }, it is privately efficient to let one player exit the market. (The case of π = u 00 + v 00 = 0 is obviously uninteresting.)
To close the model, notice that licensing can take place in several occasions: after the court decision (ex post licensing), after patent issuance but before the adopter makes technology-specific investment (interim licensing), and before patent issuance (ex ante licensing). We assume that ex post licensing is always available, but takes place only when the developer's investment project succeeds and the court upholds the patent-holder's claim, a C = 1. 10 In this case, the court grants the patent-holder the injunction power to shut down the developer, which serves as the threat point at bargaining. Other licensing opportunities are considered in Section 4. Whenever negotiating a license, we assign the whole bargaining power to the patent-holder.
We also assume that both players are protected by limited liability. The developer thus cannot be punished when receiving no revenue.
Adopter's Convex Preferences in Patent Power
This section illustrates the basic trade-offs underlying the inventor's refinement decision. Suppose that only ex post licensing is available. By backward induction, let us start with the subgame where the technology adopter uses the new technology and has successfully built a product, otherwise the game ends and the patent-holder gets a revenue u 10 and developer gets zero.
Consider the outcomes of court decision. When a C = 0, the court rejects the patent-holder's claim over the invention and so the developer can freely use the new 10 When a C = 0, without supports of patent rights the antitrust authority will challenge any attempts to monopolize the market.
technology. The returns from market are u 11 for the patent-holder and v 11 for the developer, respectively. When a C = 1, the court upholds the patent-holder's claim.
With injunction and full bargaining power the patent-holder can realize the maximal return π by either shutting down the developer (when π = u 10 ) or offering a license which fully extracts the surplus and leaves zero return to the developer (as in his outside option of exiting).
At time 2.5, with the updated beliefα, the developer's optimal investment effortê is determined bŷ e ≡ arg max
Denote the optimal investment effortsê 0 ≡ê(α 0 ) andê 1 ≡ê(α 1 ), corresponding to the patent office decision, and definev ≡ (1 −α)êv 11 − c E (ê). The developer's expected payoff from adopting the new technology is
At time 1.5, after observing α and r, the developer will opt for the new technology
For the patent-holder, she knows that after the refinement choice r the probability that the developer will adopt her invention is F (V (α, r)). Upon adoption, given the patent powerα, at time 2.5 the patent-holder's expected payoff (gross of refinement cost) iŝ
When the developer's project fails, the inventor receives u 10 ; and when the developer succeeds, the inventor receives π if her patent rights are upheld in court, and u 11
otherwise. The termα(π − u 11 ) + u 11 − u 10 reflects the effect of developer's entry on the patent-holder. Besides a direct impact u 11 − u 10 ≷ 0, the patent endows its owner another source of revenueα(π − u 11 ). Without further assumptions the term α(π−u 11 )+u 11 −u 10 can be either positive or negative. For instance, it is negative when the two players compete fiercely on the market so that u 11 < u 10 and the patent power α is low. By contrast, if the patent-holder does not participate in the downstream market and only gathers licensing income, u 11 = u 10 = 0, it is always positive.
The patent-holder's expected payoff (gross of refinement cost) at time 1.5, given that the developer adopts the new technology, is
At time 1, when making the refinement decision, the patent-holder's expected payoff
(net of refinement cost) is
With probability 1 − F (V ), there is no technology adoption and the patent-holder gets a revenue u 10 ; and with probability F (V ), the developer adopts the new technology and the patent-holder's post-adoption payoff is u τ . With these payoffs in hand, we first show the two players' preferences toward the refinement effort r. This will be the driving force of the subsequent analysis.
Because of the technology-specific investment effort, the technology adopter has a decreasing and strictly convex preference over patent power:
Together with the fact that qα 1 + (1 − q)α 0 = αr + α(1 − r), a strictly convexv implies that, for all r > 1/2,
The technology adopter will prefer some clarity, r > 1/2, to totally uninformative patent office decisions, r = 1/2. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 2 (a) and formally proven in Proposition 1, by strict convexity, the expected payoff from adoption V (α, r)
is strictly increasing in r. Intuitively, more informative patent office decisions provide better guidance about the infringement riskα and allow the developer to adjust investment as a response. Expecting more "public notice," the developer will have higher incentives to adopt the new technology.
For the patent-holder, the impact of patent powerα is
Figure 2: Refinement and post-adoption payoffs
Because π > u 11 , 11 the payoffû is increasing in patent power ifα(π − u 11 ) + u 11 − u 10 is negative, or, when it is positive, if the absolute size of [α(π − u 11 ) + u 11 − u 10 ] dê dα is not too large.
More importantly,û is strictly concave inα as long as the second-order effect of patent power on specific investment, d 2ê /dα 2 , is not too large. If fact, d 2û /dα 2 is non-negative at someα only when
A necessary condition is that [α(π − u 11 ) + u 11 − u 10 ]c ′′′ E < 0. It will not hold, and thus the patent-holder will have a concaveû, when c ′′′ E = 0, i.e, the investment cost c E takes a quadratic form. 12
11 If π = u 11 , which implies that v 11 = v 01 = 0, the technology adopter will never use the new technology. 12 If c ′′′ E > 0, the necessary condition fails whenα(π − u 11 ) + u 11 − u 10 is greater than zero for allα, which is true when the patent-holder is a pure licensor, u 11 = u 10 = 0. And in the case of π = u 10 , it requires that
When condition (1) fails so thatû is globally strictly concave inα, for all r > 1/2,
Contrary to the technology adopter, the patent-holder will prefer totally uninformative patent office decisions (r = 1/2) to some clarity (r > 1/2). And the patent-holder's post-adoption payoff u τ is strictly decreasing in r, as shown in Figure 2 (b) . This also implies that, when adoption is not a concern, F (V ) = 1, the patent applicant would be strictly better off if she could undermine the examiner's effort, i.e., reducing r to 1/2, at little cost.
Proposition 1. (Preferences conflict). Suppose that only ex post licensing is available.
Due to hold-up concerns, the technology adopter has decreasing and strictly convex preferences toward patent power. A higher refinement effort will strictly increase postadoption payoff V and thus encourage technology adoption.
When condition (1) fails, the patent-holder has strictly concave preferences over patent power. A higher refinement effort will strictly decrease the patent-holder's post-
This conflict in preferences establishes the basic trade-off in our model regarding the patent refinement, or the uncertainty of patent boundary. Suppose that condition
(1) doesn't hold. Post-adoption, the patent-holder and adopter have opposite interests in the refinement effort. To determine the optimal refinement effort, let's assume that the patent-holder's expected payoff at the refinement stage,
is strictly concave in r over the range [r, 1] . 13 By ∂u τ /∂r < 0, we immediately obtain that the inventor has no refinement incentives when F (V ) = 1 at r = r, i.e., when technology adoption concern is absent.
determine the optimal refinement effort is
13 It can be "forced" to hold by assuming c ′′ R large enough. Notice that at r = 1/2, both ∂Ψ/∂r = ∂Λ/∂r = 0. If we let r = 0 while maintaining c ′ R (1/2) = 0, r = 1/2 will become a critical point. Together with the concavity of the payoff function, the optimal refinement is always r = 1/2. For all r > 1/2, ∂V /∂r is strictly positive and ∂u τ /∂r strictly negative. When choosing the refinement effort, the trade-off, if any, lies between higher adoption probability and larger post-adoption revenue. But whether there is such a trade-off crucially depends on the patent-holder's business strategy in the downstream market.
Let us consider two market structures. In the first scenario, we consider π = u 10 and so when obtaining an injunction the patent-holder will shut down the developer.
In the second scenario, we assume that u 11 = u 10 = 0, and so π = v 11 , i.e., the patentholder is a pure licensor and does not participate in downstream market. This is a special case of π = u 11 + v 11 , where after infringement (a C = 1) the patent-holder will grant an ex post license and extracts a licensing fee v 11 from the developer.
When π = u 10 , the patent is used to excluded any competitors from the downstream market. Technology adoption does not serve the patent-holder's interest: ∀α ∈ [0, 1),
and so
Although refinement encourages technology adoption, it is not in the patent-holder's interests. The patent-holder has no incentives to refine the patent application, the optimal r = r, whatever her invention quality α.
On the other hand, when the patent-holder is a pure licensor, π = v 11 and u 11 = u 10 = 0, her post-adoption payoff is
Exerting a higher refinement effort and raising adoption incentives thus bring a benefit of increasing the probability that the patent-holder will gain some licensing income.
The patent-holder may have incentives to engage in refinement in this case.
To gain more insights, let us consider the special case of a quadratic investment cost function, c E (e) = e 2 /2K, with 1/K and 1/ν strictly larger than v 11 so that the optimalê(α) < 1 for allα. Note that under the quadratic cost function, c ′′′ E = 0; condition (1) fails. The patent-holder has a strictly concave preference toward patent power.
With this cost function, we can solve analytically the developer's optimal investment effort and his expected payoff from adopting the new technology:
This cost function also gives us the nice property that, given technology adoption, the overall probability that the adopter will successfully introduce a product is not affected by refinement effort:
We can then measure ex ante technology diffusion by considering only the adoption probability F (V ).
For convenience, define
which summarizes the impact of refinement effort r on technology adoption incentives.
We can confirm that the developer strictly prefers a higher r: ∀r > 1/2 and α ∈ (0, 1),
A higher refinement effort encourages technology adoption.
Concerning the impact of invention quality α:
For the patent-holder, under quadratic investment cost, the expected payoff from technology adoption is
through which the refinement effort r exerts its effect on the patent-holder's postadoption payoff. Similarly, for all r > 1/2 and α ∈ (0, 1),
a higher refinement effort reduces the patent-holder's post-adoption payoff.
With quadratic investment cost, the first-older condition to determine the optimal r is
A necessary and sufficient condition for the patent-holder to be willing to exert any refinement effort is, when evaluated at r = r > 1/2,
It can be shown that the right-hand side of the condition is decreasing in α, and when α → 0, Ψ/Λ → 1. Therefore, as long as F ′ V /F is uniformly bounded, 14 this condition is less likely to hold when α is small enough. For instance, under uniform distribution,
which won't be true when α ≤ (1 − α) 2 . In addition, because r > 1/2, it is less likely to satisfy when r becomes larger. Higher efforts from the patent examiner thus will crowd out, or substitute, the patent applicant's refinement efforts.
14 Roughly speaking, the requirement of uniformly bounded F ′ V /F = (dF/dV )/(F/V ) means that there is no sudden jump in percentage of probability density.
Proposition 2. (Low private refinement). Suppose that only ex post licensing is available. The inventor will not exert any refinement effort when F (V ) = 1 and so technology adoption is not a concern, or when π = u 10 and so the patent-holder prefers to monopolize the market.
When the inventor is a pure licensor (u 11 = u 10 = 0 and so π = v 11 ), and the technology adopter has a quadratic investment cost function, c E (e) = e 2 /2K, the inventor will exert some refinement effort r > r if and only if condition (2) holds at r = r.
When F ′ V /F is uniformly bounded, this condition will not hold when α is low enough. Remark 1. (IPR strategy and business model). Here we assume that the patent-holder is already operating in the market. If the patent-holder has an interest in obtaining the monopoly position, π = u 10 , but needs to make some investment in order to enter the downstream market, then the same reasoning suggests that the patent-holder would not want to engage in refinement at all. Again, a higher refinement effort will attract more entry and reduce the prospect to maintain the monopoly, for the patent-holder will have to rely on the court's injunction grant to exclude competitors. This suggests a relationship between a patent-holder's refinement policy and business strategy. At the aggregate level, it would be interesting to investigate the prevailing market structure and the degree of patent rights uncertainty across industries.
Remark 2. (The third case). The case of π = v 10 is somewhat between the two cases π = u 10 and π = u 11 +v 11 . When π = v 10 , post infringement, the patent-holder will exit the market and grant the developer a license in exchange for a payment. If u 11 ≥ u 10 , or if the developer's entry has a negative impact on the patent-holder, u 11 < u 10 , but its magnitude is not too large, then u τ > u 10 and the patent-holder faces the same trade-off between encouraging adoption F (V ) and raising post-adoption payoff u τ as in the case of π = u 11 + v 11 .
However, if the competition is so fierce that u τ ≤ u 10 , as in the case of π = u 10 , then the patent-holder will against not exert any refinement effort. Despite the assumption that post infringement the patent-holder can extract the full surplus v 10 via licensing, this would happen because ex post licensing only takes place when the court upholds the patent rights. To see this, note that with quadratic cost function,
which is negative when α is small enough.
Remark 3. (Non-observable refinement)
. When the refinement effort r is not observable to the technology adopter, a rational expectation equilibrium requires that, along the equilibrium path, the developer guesses right the equilibrium refinement effort exerted by the patent-holder, and the latter won't secretly deviate from the equilibrium level.
Letr ∈ [r, 1] be a rational expectation equilibrium, with correspondingq ≡ αr + (1 − α)(1 −r),α 1 ≡ αr/q andα 0 ≡ α(1 −r)/(1 −q). At the technology adoption stage (time 1.5), the adopter then expects a payoffṼ ≡qv(α 1 ) + (1 −q)v(α 0 ). The adoption probability is F (Ṽ ) and, upon adoption, the developer will exert an effort e 1 ≡ê(α 1 ) when a P = 1 andẽ 0 ≡ê(α 0 ) when a P = 0, respectively. The patent-holder's equilibrium payoff, then, is U = u 10 + F (Ṽ )(u τ − u 10 ) − c R , where
Suppose thatr > r, the patent-holder exerts some refinement effort in the equilibrium.
Consider what if she deviates from the equilibrium. Because the refinement effort is not observable, after the deviation the developer still believes that the prevailing refinement isr and soṼ as well asẽ 1 andẽ 0 are unchanged. A secret deviation thus changes the patent-holder's payoff by:
Becauseẽ 1 <ẽ 0 , the patent-holder will have an incentive to deviate to a lower refinement effort as long as α(π −u 10 ) ≥ (1−α)(u 11 −u 10 ), which is true for both π = u 10 and π = v 11 while u 11 = u 10 = 0. In these cases, the only rational expectation equilibrium is r = r.
Furthermore, a necessary condition of no secret deviation is α 1 − α < u 11 − u 10 π − u 10 , which could be satisfied only when the presence of the developer on the downstream market exerts a positive benefit to the patent-holder, u 11 > u 10 ; and, given this holds, the invention quality is low enough. holder's refinement incentives. We separately consider interim and ex ante licensing (see Figure 3) . Ex post licensing remains as an alternative if no agreement is reached at an earlier stage. However, to simplify the analysis, we do not allow interim licensing when considering ex ante licensing. We let the patent-holder make licensing offers when the opportunity arises.
Note that when π = u 10 , the patent-holder prefers the technology adopter to stay off the market even if the latter successfully conducts the investment project. Licensing, when taking place, will involve the highly controversial reverse payment where the patent-holder pays the technology adopter in exchange of the latter's exit, or not using the new technology in the first place.
Even if reverse payment can escape skepticism and challenges from antitrust authority, by assigning the whole bargaining power to the patent-holder, the technology adopter's expected payoff under en ante or interim licensing will be the same as in the previous case. The patent-holder will still have no incentive to engage in any refinement in order to dissuade the developer's from using the new technology, and thus avoid the event to "buy out" the developer. 15 For this reason, in the remaining of this section we consider only the case where the patent-holder is a pure licensor, π = v 11 , with u 10 = u 11 = 0.
Interim licensing: Referring to Figure 3 , interim licensing takes place before the technology adopter's specific investment but after the patent office issues its decision.
Under the assumptions that the technology adopter is protected by limited liability and the investment effort e is not contractible, the type of licenses the patent-holder can offer is a royalty l ∈ [0, 1] such that when the developer's project succeeds, the patent-holder gets a share l · v 11 . Let l 0 and l 1 be the licensing terms offered by the patent-holder, given the patent office decision a P = 0 and a P = 1, respectively.
To induce acceptance, the royalty l i cannot exceed the prevailing patent powerα i , i ∈ {0, 1}.
When the developer accepts the offer l i , he will exert an investment effortê(l i ),
with an expected project returnv(l i ). The patent-holder's expected licensing income isû(l i ) =ê(l i )l i v 11 . Denote l * as the optimal offer that maximizes the patent-holder's expected licensing income in the absence of the participation constraint l i ≤α i :
Denoteû(l * ) =û * andv(l * ) =v * . We will impose the following assumption in this
Assumption 2.û(l) = lê(l)v 11 is strictly concave in l and the maximizer l * = arg max lû is an (unique) interior solution, l * ∈ (0, 1).
Given a refinement effort r and the associated patent powerα 1 andα 0 , with the opportunity of offering an interim license, the patent-holder's expected payoff depends on whether l * is feasible under the prevailing patent power. Whenα 0 ≥ l * , the patentholder can offer l * at both events a P = 0 and 1, with an expected payoff
The technology adopter will have a constant payoffv * , and given adoption, the patentholder enjoys a constant licensing incomeû * . Whenα 0 < l * ≤α 1 , the optimal offer l * is feasible only when the patent office issues a favorable decision a P = 1; and when a P = 0, the patent-holder can only charge a licensing termα 0 because of the binding participation constraint. The patent-holder's expected payoff is
The first-and second-order conditions can be found in Section 3, dû/dα and d
2û
/dα 2 , withα replaced by l, and setting π = v 11 as well as u 11 = u 10 = 0. It is easy to check that the first-order condition is strictly positive at l = 0 and strictly negative at l = 1 (forê(1) = 0). Again, the second-order condition is satisfied globally for quadratic c E .
where
] are the developer's and patent-holder's post-adoption payoffs, respectively. It is easy to see that V in ≥ V and u in.
τ ≥ u τ ; and whenα 0 < l <α 1 , we have strict inequality for both payoffs. For simplicity, we will again assume that the payoff F (V in. )u in.
τ − c R is strictly concave in r. And whenα 1 < l * , the participation constraint l i ≤α i is binding for both i ∈ {0, 1}. Whatever the patent-holder decision is, interim licensing is irrelevant, and the patent-holder gets the same payoff as before, F (V )u τ − c R .
We are concerned with how the interim licensing opportunity will affect the patent-
holder's refinement decision as well as technology adoption incentives. When r = r, denoteα 1 (r) as α 1 andα 0 (r) as α 0 . It turns out that introducing this opportunity may eliminate the refinement effort from a patent-holder with high invention quality α, the one is supposed to have strong refinement incentives in the previous case. When α is large enough so that α 0 ≥ l * , the optimal refinement effort is either no refinement or large enough so thatα 0 < l * <α 1 . And when
at r such thatα 0 → l * − , interim licensing will mute any refinement effort by the patent-holder. Given l * = 1/2, this condition is more likely to hold when α is higher.
When α is small enough so that α 1 < l * , then interim licensing will not have significant negative impact on the refinement effort. That is, it is impossible to have the case where under interim licensing the optimal refinement is low enough so that α 1 < l * , but without interim licensing the refinement effort is high enough so that
The analysis suggests that, interim licensing may not improve the clarity of the patent rights for a high quality invention (high α). Nevertheless, by alleviating the holdup problem it can substitute for the patent-holder's refinement activity. To see this, recall that with quadratic investment, given adoption, the average probability that the developer will successfully conduct the investment project is qê 1 +(1−q)ê 0 = (1−α)Kv 11 .
Fixing α and distribution F (·), the degree of technology is thus determined by the developer's expected payoff from using the new invention, V (α, r) = (1 − α) 2 Ψv 2 11 K/2. By ∂Ψ/∂r > 0, the upper bound of this payoff is thus (1 − α)v 2 11 K/2, when r = 1.
Suppose that α is so large that α 0 ≥ l * and condition (3) holds, the patent-holder
gives up any refinement activity under interim licensing. This is the case only if α > l * = 1/2. The optimal royalty l * = 1/2 thus determines the developer's payoff,v * = v 2 11 K/8. Given adoption, the expected successful probability under interim licensing is higher than without it,ê(l * ) = Kv 11 /2 > (1 − α)Kv 11 , for α > 1/2. And the developer's payoff will also be greater if α is large enough: v 2 11 K/8 ≥ (1 − α)v 2 11 K/2 whenever α ≥ 3/4. In other words, for α large enough, interim licensing may eliminate refinement without hampering technology diffusion. Note that this comparison is made by using the highest refinement r = 1 when there is no interim licensing. Any lower r will only strengthen the result.
Remark. An interesting result shown in the proof of this proposition is how interim licensing may change the adoption v.s. revenue trade-off when α > 1/2 and α 0 < l * < α 1 . When α falls in the middle range such that α 0 < l * < α 1 , the developer's and patent-holder's post-adoption payoffs are always V in. and u in. τ , respectively. And when α > 1/2, we show that ∂V in. /∂r > ∂V /∂r and ∂u in.
τ /∂r > ∂u τ /∂r, that is, interim licensing will increase the responsiveness of adoption to refinement while reducing the negative impact of refinement on the patent-holder's post-adoption payoff. Furthermore, with quadratic investment cost and so l * = 1/2, we show that the latter effect may be so strong that u in.
τ may be increasing in r for r close to 1/2. In other words, there may be no more adoption v.s. revenue trade-off.
Ex ante licensing: Let us turn to ex ante licensing, which takes place before patent office decision. Referring to Figure 3 , we can further distinguish between two cases: bargaining before or after the patent-holder incurs the refinement efforts. To focus on the change these licensing opportunities would bring, we do not allow interim licensing here.
When ex ante licensing still takes place after the patent-holder chooses the refinement level, first notice that, by assuming the adoption cost c f as the technology adopter's private information, it doesn't matter for the patent-holder whether the license is offered before or after the technology adoption decision is made. Lacking other means to screen this information, at most one license will be accepted along the equilibrium path. 17 In addition, we assume that even if the adopter has taken the license, he can still walk away at no cost. That is, if he decides not to adopt the patent-holder's technology and remains inactive, then there is no way the patent-holder can impose any fine or extract any surplus from the adopter. This can be justified by the assumptions that the technology adopter is protected by limited liability, and that by remaining idle he gets zero payoff.
Let l * * be the optimal value of the following program:
That is, l * * is the optimal licensing term that maximizes the patent-holder's expected licensing income by taking into account technology adoption decision. (If the optimizers are not unique, choose the smallest one.) This is the optimal ex ante licensing term the patent-holder will offer when facing only the technology adoption issue. 18
Because F ′ > 0 and ∂v/∂l < 0, the ex ante optimal royalty l * * < l * . Bringing in the technology adoption concern will reduce the optimal royalty relative to the case where the adopter has already employed the patent-holder's invention.
Despite the opportunity of ex ante licensing, if he decides to use the patent-holder's invention the technology adopter can do so without taking the license and then resolving any patent disputes in court. When ex ante license is offered after the patent-
holder's refinement decision, at the contracting stage a participation constraint facing the patent-holder is that the technology adopter's expected payoff by taking the ex ante license should be no lower than V (α, r), what he would expect by proceeding alone.
Suppose that ∂V (α, r)/∂r > 0, as is the case under quadratic investment cost c E .
The payoff V (α, r) attains its minimal value at r = r. It follows that, for α high enough such that α 0 ≥ l * * , the optimal royalty l * * is implementable in the absence of any refinement effort,v(l * * ) ≥v(α 0 ) > V (α, r). The patent-holder will have no incentives
to make any refinement efforts at all. And this is true as long asv(l * * ) ≥ V (α, r).
Now suppose thatv(l * * ) < V (α, r), and so for all r ∈ [r, 1], V (α, r) >v(l * * ), the adopter will not accept the royalty l * * . Intuitively, in this case more refinement effort will only increase the adopter's reservation value V (α, r) and reduce the feasible royalty terms. We should expect no refinement either.
the one with higher revenue.
18 For simplicity, we assume that the patent-holder cannot do better by offering random contracts, i.e., (l s ) s=1,...,S such that the royalty l s is realized with probability q s ∈ (0, 1), with S s=1 q s = 1. By the same reasoning, this can be guaranteed by the same conditions as in Lemma 1 below.
To show this result, note that the patent-holder's ex ante license offering may contain two royalties, l 0 and l 1 , contingent on the patent office decision a P ∈ {0, 1}.
Given the refinement decision, the patent-holder can offer (l 0 , l 1 ) = (α 0 ,α 1 ) that fully replicates the outcome of no ex ante licensing. There is no loss of generality in assuming that the technology adopter, once decided to use the patent-holder's invention, will also take the ex ante license.
The following lemma nevertheless finds a sufficient condition under which it is optimal for the patent-holder to offer a fixed royalty l 0 = l 1 . (Its proof is in Appendix A.)
It requires that the program max lû (l) is well-behaved and the elasticity of investment effortê with respect to the royalty l,
, is strictly monotonic in l for l ≤ l * . Because
the requirement on elasticity holds as long as the investment cost function satisfies c ′′′ E ≥ 0, which is certainly true for the quadratic function.
Lemma 1. (Optimal ex ante license). Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. When the elasticity ξ is strictly monotonic in l for l ≤ l * , the optimal contract (l 0 , l 1 ) that solves the program: ∀q,
has the property that l 0 = l 1 .
By this lemma, if the optimal license leaves the developer an expected adoption payoffv, then the patent-holder will optimally construct the license such that the royalty is invariant in patent office decision, l 0 = l 1 . Letl be the optimal licensing offer, which must satisfyv(l) ≥ V (α, r), where r is the refinement effort chosen by the patent-holder at time 1. The patent-holder's expected payoff, when making the refinement decision, is 19
19 Notice that given r, and thus given q, a feasible contract that would leave the patent-holder the same payoff is l 0 =α 0 and l 1 =α 1 . By Lemma 1, the patent-holder thus is strictly better off at the optimal ex ante contract.
Suppose that the refinement effort r and the subsequent ex ante license are both chosen at the optimal level. When the patent-holder exerts some refinement effort, r ∈ (r, 1), the developer's participation constraint must be binding,v(l) = V (α, r).
If not,v(l) > V (α, r), then the patent-holder can marginally reduce the refinement effort, saving the refinement cost without jeopardizing her ability to offer the samel and receive the same expected licensing income F (v(l))û(l).
Obviously, when the developer has a preference toward the clarity of the patent rights, ∂V /∂r > 0, the patent-holder will optimally choose not to exert any refinement effort, the optimal r = r. A higher r requires a larger cost c R and will raise the developer's reservation value at the contracting stage, V (α, r), and thus reduce the feasible set of ex ante contracts. For the patent-holder, there is no gain in engaging in patent refinement.
Lastly, consider an ex ante license offered before the patent-holder makes the refinement effort. If at the contracting stage the patent-holder can commit to the refinement effort she'll exert later, then we go back to the previous case. A higher refinement effort will raise the adopter's reservation value V (α, r) at the contracting stage. Again there will be no refinement at all. Suppose that the patent-holder lacks this commitment power.
If the technology adopter refuses the patent-holder's licensing offer, then the game continues as if there is only ex post licensing. Denoter as the patent-holder's optimal refinement effort in that case. The technology adopter is willing to accept an ex ante license when his payoff is higher than V (α,r). An ex ante license that can fully mimic the outcome without ex ante licensing, and thus will be accepted by the developer is: a royalty l 0 =α 0 (l 1 =α 1 ) is imposed when the patent office issues a decision a P = 0 (a P = 1, respectively). (And by Lemma 1, to keep the developer's adoption payoff at V (α,r), the patent-holder can do strictly better by offering a constant royalty.) It follows that ex post licensing will become an off-path event, and the patent-holder and developer will agree on an ex ante license. After the agreement, the patent-holder will no longer exert any refinement effort.
Again, no refinement effort from the patent-holder doesn't mean that the overall technology adoption rate will suffer. Indeed, in the case where the ex ant licensing takes place before the refinement decision, 20 the fact that the optimal ex ante licensel has to 20 When ex ante licensing takes place after the refinement decision, the optimal royalty is either l * * (when v(l * * ) ≥ V (α, r)) orl such thatv(l) = V (α, r) (whenv(l * * ) < V (α, r)). However, the optimal refinement without ex ante licensing,r, maybe lead tov(l * * ) < V (α,r). We need further information aboutr to satisfy the participation constraintv(l) ≥ V (α,r) implies that the technology adoption probability will not be damaged by this earlier bargaining opportunity. Furthermore, in the case of quadratic investment cost, without ex ant licensing the probability that the developer will successfully conduct the investment project is (1 − α)Kv 11 . And by the participation constraint: ∀r > 1/2,
for ∂Ψ/∂r > 0 whenever r > 1/2 and Ψ = 1 at r = 1/2. The successful probability, e(l) = (1 −l)v 11 K, thus, is strictly larger than that without ex ante licensing. When ex ante licensing takes place before the refinement decision, the overall probability that the developer will successfully conduct the downstream investment with the new invention is higher than that without ex ante licensing.
Multiple Patent-Holders
In this section we consider a simple symmetric multiple patent-holders case. Suppose that there are two patent-holders, P 1 and P 2 , with identical ex ante invention quality α. The developer can decide whether to use both inventions or only one of it, and then exerts an unobservable investment effort e ∈ [0, 1] with a quadratic cost c E = e 2 /2K. To incorporate P i 's invention, the developer has to incur an adoption cost For simplicity, assume that both patent-holders are pure licensors and have no other income, and ignore interim and ex ante licensing opportunities. Denote r i ∈ [r, 1] as the refinement effort exerted by P i , with a common refinement cost c R for both i ∈ {1, 2}.
The patent-holders make refinement decisions simultaneously, and the chosen r 1 and r 2 are observable to other players. Assume that the patent office makes independent decisions about the two patent applications. Let q i ≡ αr i + (1 − α)(1 − r i ) be the probability that the patent office issues a favorable decision to P i , and (α 1 i ,α 0 i ) the pair of patent power, i ∈ {1, 2}. Also assume that the court makes infringement judgement independently.
If the developer only adopts P i 's technology, i ∈ {1, 2}, then everything goes as in the case of pure licensor in Section 3, with v 11 = ρv. Given quadratic investment cost,
The post-adoption payoffs are
for the developer, and
for the patent-holder P i whose invention is used into the development project. The patent-holder P −i whose invention is not used receives no return.
If the developer incorporates both technologies, then he is subject to both patentholders' patent rights. Given the two patentees' patent powerα 1 andα 2 , the developer chooses the investment e to maximizê
The post-adoption payoff is
With quadratic investment cost,ê = (1 −α 1 )(1 −α 2 )Kv andv = (1 −α 1 ) 2 (1 − α 2 ) 2v2 K/2, and, after some computation,
To derive the patent-holders' post-adoption payoffs, suppose that if the developer infringes on both patents, then the surplusv is equally shared by both patentees. Given a pair of patent power (α 1 ,α 2 ) and the corresponding probability of successê(α 1 ,α 2 ), the patent-holder P i expects an ex post licensing payment
with quadratic investment cost. With these payoffs, let us consider in turn the developer's technology choice and patent-holders' refinement decisions.
Given adoption cost c 1 and c 2 , the developer will incorporate both technologies into the development project if 21
which requires thatV − V 1 > c 2 andV − V 2 > c 1 . And he will either choose only one technology, or none at all whenV
Replacing with the payoffs derived above, adopting both technologies requires
And a necessary condition is
This condition is more likely to fail whenρ is higher, i.e., there is less complementary between the two technologies, or when the ex ante invention quality or patent protection is higher, for
by the sam reason as ∂V /∂α < 0 in Section 3. More importantly, refinement efforts also have an impact. Condition (4) is less likely to hold when patent-holders exert less refinement efforts, for ∂Ψ i /∂r i > 0, i ∈ {1, 2}. Denote ψ > 1 as the lowest possible value of Ψ i , which happens when r i = r, then Ψ i ∈ [ψ, 1/1 − α], i ∈ {1, 2}. When
the developer will not use both technologies without sufficient refinement efforts from both patent-holders. Even when there is significant synergy between the two technologies (ρ is low), as long as each invention has some stand-alone value (and so ρ = 0), refinement is required for efficient technology exploitation. Furthermore, by
, and
when condition (4) holds, higher refinement efforts from either party will increase both V − V 1 andV − V 2 and thus the chance that the developer will adopt both technologies. and the invention quality α is not too low, such that condition (5) holds, technological synergy (ρ < 1) by itself cannot induce the developer to adopt both technologies. The developer will use both technologies only when refinement efforts r 1 and r 2 are high enough.
Next let us consider the patent-holders' refinement decisions. Given the developer's technology choice, a patent-holder P i 's expected payoff from refinement is
That is, whenV − (c 1 + c 2 ) > max{V 1 − c 1 , V 2 − c 2 , 0}, the developer will use both technologies and P i gets a post-adoption payoffū i τ ; and when V i − c i ≥ max{V − c 1 − c 2 , V −i − c −i , 0}, the developer chooses only her technology and she gets a payoff u i τ . Otherwise either the developer chooses only the other patentee's technology or none at all, and in both events P i receives no return. To save the space, define adoption probabilities by:
Our interests here is the strategic relationship between the two patent-holders' refinement decisions. But instead of a full-fledge analysis, for simplicity let use consider two special cases: perfect complements (ρ = 0) and perfect substitutes (ρ = 1). We also assume uniform distribution for the technology adoption cost over the support [0, 1/ν], with ν small enough. The CDF is thus F (c) = νc for c ∈ [0, 1/ν].
When ρ = 1 and the two technologies are perfect substitutes, by Ψ i ≤ 1/1 − α, condition (4) is violated for any level of refinement effort and so the developer will never consider using both technologies. 22 The two patent-holders compete against each other for the developer's adoption of their own technology. The patentee P i 's payoff from refinement is U i = p i u i τ − c R (r i ). On the other hand, when ρ = 0 and the two technologies are perfect complements, the developer will consider either using both inventions or note. The patent-holder P i 's expected payoff from refinement is
The following proposition shows that refinement decisions tend to be strategic complements in both cases. (See Appendix A for proof.) Again, for simplicity, we assume that c ′′ R is large enough so that the patent-holder's expected payoff is strictly concave in refinement effort.
Proposition 6. (Strategic dependence of refinement decisions). Consider the case of two symmetric patent-holders with only ex post licensing. Assume that investment cost takes a quadratic form, and adoption cost has a uniform distribution.
Suppose that ρ = 1 and so the two technologies are perfect substitutes. When r i ≥ r −i and so V i ≥ V −i , the patent-holder P i 's optimal refinement r i is increasing in r −i , i, −i ∈ {1, 2}, and i = −i. And when
then refinement decisions are strategic complements to each other. This condition is more likely to hold when α is lower, and will be satisfied when α ≤ 1/2.
22 In fact, by condition (5) as long as ρ 2 ≥ 1 − α the option of adopting both technologies is irrelevant.
Suppose that ρ = 0 and so the two technologies are perfect complements. When the patent-holders have incentives to exert some refinement effort, the optimal r 1 and r 2 > r, then the two patent-holders refinement decisions are strategic complements.
As shown in Section 4, with multiple patent-holders one might expect the patentholders to use interim or ex ante licensing to mitigate the hold-up problem. However, to the extent that earlier licensing is absent and so hold-up threat is severe, Proposition 6 has some interesting policy implication. When refinement decisions are strategic complements, inducing any patent applicant to exercise more refinement effort would have the snowballing effect of increasing the total refinement efforts and thus significantly reduce the overall uncertainty. It would be worthwhile to introduce an incentive scheme to encourage private refinement. And even if the introduced policy only directly affects some, not all, patent-holders, through strategic complementarity the indirect impact could be sizable. (On the other hand, in the case of strategic substitutes, one applicant's higher refinement effort would reduce that of other applicants. Such an incentive scheme has to be carefully designed to take into account this negative effect.)
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we investigated a patent-holder's incentives to reduce the uncertainty surrounding her patent rights. We showed that, under some mild conditions, the patent-holder's refinement effort is motivated by technology diffusion concerns. But even when the patent-holder acts as a pure licensor, and thus has no other income than licensing payment, we found that private refinement effort may vanish when the patent-holder has a sufficiently low quality invention (low α). The last result clearly echoes the general perception in software or e-business industry, where it is claimed that patents have been issued to technologies already in the public domain and the patent office examination fails to clear the enforceability of these patents in court. Earlier licensing, in particular at the ex ante stage, could alleviate the hold-up problem and fully substitute the patent-holder's refinement effort without jeopardizing technology diffusion. This result implies that if we rely on early licensing to mitigate hold-up, then fuzzy patent rights is one thing we have to live with.
For future research, the strong assumptions imposed in our model provide quite a few natural extensions. First, the treatment of the multiple patent-holder case in Section 5 is far from complete. Besides deriving the strategic relationship of refine-ment decisions for other cases of ρ, i.e., the degree of substitutability between the two inventions, it'd be important to let patent-holders offer interim or even ex ante licenses, jointly or separately. Allowing licensing would contribute to the literature of standard-setting organization and patent pools and deepen our understanding of how these collective rights organizations, or IPR clearinghouses, would affect the overall performance of the patent system. For instance, adding refinement decisions before the formation of a patent pool might help pin down whether the demand or competition margin will bind, and thus whether a patent pool is pro-competitive (Lerner and Tirole, 2004 ).
Second, we may introduce asymmetric information into the model, for instance, by considering a case where the patent-holder has private information about the invention quality α. The observable refinement effort then serves a signaling function.
Because the technology adopter's adoption payoff is decreasing in the invention quality, ∂V /∂α < 0, to encourage adoption a patent-holder might refrain from refinement with an attempt to convince the adopter that she has a very low quality invention, i.e., her α is so low that condition (2) fails. On the other hand, when refinement cannot fully reveal the patent-holder's private information (i.e., when the prevailing equilibrium is not a separating equilibrium), asymmetric information persists at the subsequent licensing bargaining. At that stage, the patent-holder might have an opposite interest and want the developer to believe that she has a higher α in order to extract a more favorable licensing term. It would then be interesting to see how these two forces shape the refinement incentives and licensing outcomes.
Lastly, despite the positive results obtained in Section 4, it might be too optimistic to assume that early (ex ante) licensing is always available. 23 And it may well happen that not all potential developers have the same access to ex ante licensing. When it is not available, our results suggest a policy response to let public decision-makers (the patent office or court) be the primary source to provide certainty of the patent system.
To introduce the patent office examiner into the model, we may also want to relax the assumption that the inventor's refinement effort has unbiased effect, r = Pr .(a P = a C ) for both a C ∈ {0, 1}. It would be interesting to consider a patent applicant's biased incentives to improve the patent powerα 1 without jeopardizingα 0 , when the patent office issues an unfavorable decision (Meurer and Bessen, 2006) . If this is true, and if the patent examination remains an ex parte procedure, then patent examiners should be provided with adequate incentives to counter this bias and raise the informativeness of issued patents in the other side. That is, we might consider introducing some "advocacy" elements into patent examination, with the applicant and examiner searching for information to support opposite causes (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1999) .
Concerning the role of the court, similar extension could be introduced at the litigation stage. That is, we could consider a situation where both a P and a C are signals about a "true" patent boundary, which has a true value 1 (i.e., the patent-holder should get the exclusive power of the technology) with probability α. The probability distribution of a P is affected by the applicant's as well as the examiner's efforts, while that of a C is affected by the litigation inputs of patent-holder and potential infringer or patent challenger in court. We can then use this framework to re-examine the "rational ignorance" hypothesis and consider the optimal division of labor between the patent office and private challengers to improve the performance of the patent system (Lemley, 2001; Chiou, 2008) .
Appendix

A Proofs Proposition 1
Proof. The strict convexity of V and strict concavity of u τ when condition (1) fails are established in the main text. Here we show that by strict convexity the payoff V is strictly increasing in r.
Fix α ∈ (0, 1). By strictly convexity, for any r > 1/2, V (r) > V (1/2). Consider any r andr such that 1 ≥ r >r > 1/2. Let q = αr + (1 − α)(1 − r),α 1 = αr/q, and α 0 = α(1 − r)/(1 − q), and denoteq ≡ αr + (1 − α)(1 −r),α 1 ≡α 1 (r) = αr/q, and α 0 ≡α 0 (r) = α(1 −r)/(1 −q). Because r >r,α 1 >α 1 >α 0 >α 0 .
To show that V (r) = qv(α 1 )
That is, on the space of (α,v(α)),ṽ is constructed by replacingv with the convex combination of (α 1 ,v(α 1 )) and (α 0 ,v(α 0 )) forα ∈ [α 0 ,α 1 ]; and keepṽ =v otherwise.
It is easy to check thatṽ is convex, though not strictly convex due to the linear part ofα ∈ [α 0 ,α 1 ]. By convexity,
and by convex combination,
Thus V (r) ≥ V (r). To show strict inequality, becausev is strictly convex inα,
or, equivalently,
That is, the slope of the line connecting (α 0 ,v(α 0 )) and (α 1 ,v(α 1 )), γ, lies between the slope ofv when evaluated atα 0 andα 1 . Extend the line to the interval
. By condition (6) and the strict convexity ofv,
Therefore,
By the same reasoning, whenû is strictly concave inα, the payoff u τ is strictly decreasing in r.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 3
Proof. Let us consider three cases according to the level of α. When α 0 ≥ l * , i.e., the invention quality α is high enough so that at r = r, the patent power is strong enough to support the optimal royalty l * even when the patent office issues an unfavorable decision a P = 0. (A necessary condition is α ≥ l * .) The patent-holder's expected payoff from refinement is 24
When the refinement effort is so low that l * ≤α 0 ≤ α 0 , the patent-holder can charge l * regardless of the patent office decision. And if the patent-holder chooses r large enough such thatα 0 < l * <α 1 , then l * is feasible only when the patent office issues a favorable decision to the patent-holder, a P = 1.
To find the optimal r, first notice that when l * ≤α 0 , the revenue is not affected by r, and so the optimal r = r over this range. It follows that if ∂U in. /∂r ≤ 0 aŝ
then under interim licensing the patent-holder will not exert any refinement effort, the optimal r = r.
Condition (3) is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition to reach no refinement from the patent-holder. If it fails, we need to compare
to determine the optimal r. The optimal r then exhibits a "bang-bang" property: It is either r or "jumps" to some level large enough such thatα 0 < l * <α 1 .
Consider when condition (3) is more likely to hold. A higher α will require a larger r to reach the same level ofα 0 , i.e.,
On the revenue side, when evaluating atα 0 = l * ,
24 Because at r > 1/2, α 1 > α 0 ≥ l * , further increase r will causeα 1 > l * .
thus to keepα 0 = l * ,
And fromα 0 = l * , we can find α = rl * /[rl * + (1 − r)(1 − l * )], and therefore α ≥ r if and only if l * ≥ 1/2 (with quadratic investment cost, l * = 1/2). We can conclude that when l * ≥ 1/2, condition (3) is more likely to hold for high values of α.
Next, when α is in an intermediate range such that α 0 < l * ≤ α 1 , then for all r ≥ r, the patent-holder's payoff is
for a higher r will still cause l * to stay in the open interval (α 0 ,α 1 ). The first-order conditio to determine the optimal refinement effort is
Comparing with the case where only ex post licensing is allowed, the opportunity of interim licensing raises both the adopter's and patent-holder's expected payoffs upon adoption. It also changes how these payoffs will respond to the refinement effort,
When α ≥ 1/2 and so ∂q/∂r ≥ 0, interim licensing will make the developer's payoff more responsive to the refinement effort, ∂V in /∂r > ∂V /∂r, and reduce the negative impact of refinement effort on the patent-holder's licensing income, ∂u in. τ /∂r > ∂u τ /∂r. In fact, it may even happen that the refinement effort will increase licensing income,
τ /∂r > 0. To see this, consider the case of quadratic investment cost, under which the optimal royalty is l * = 1/2 and soû = Kv 2 11 /4. The expected licensing payment is
The impact of r on u in τ is proportional to
which is positive when α > 1/2 and r → 1/2 (assuming r is sufficiently close to 1/2).
In this case, the adoption v.s. revenue tradeoff will disappear, and the patent-holder will have higher incentives to engage in refinement.
Lastly, when α is small enough so that α 1 < l * , the patent-holder's expected payoff from refinement is
With low refinement interim licensing is irrelevant regardless of the patent office decision. And only r is large enough so thatα 0 < l * ≤α 1 could the patent-holder offer l * after a decision a P = 1.
The same as in the high α case, we can check the first-order condition at the boundary between the two regimes to gain some information about the optimal refinement effort. Here it should be evaluated atα 1 → l * + :
If this term is (weakly) negative, then the optimal refinement effort falls into the lower end. Furthermore, comparing the first-order conditions with and without interim licensing atα 1 → l * + shows that
The first-order condition jumps upward at the pointα 1 = l * . We can conclude that in this case interim licensing will not discourage too much the refinement effort, if ever. That is, if without interim licensing the optimalr is large enough so thatα 0 < l * <α 1 , then interim licensing will maintain a refinement effort such that the relation α 0 < l * <α 1 still holds. Conversely, when expression (7) is (weakly) negative so that the optimal refinement effort under interim licensing falls into the low range such that l * >α 1 >α 0 , then it would already be the case without interim licensing.
Lemma 1
Proof. First notice that the optimal l i ≤ l * , i ∈ {0, 1}. For if not, some l i > l * and so ∂û/∂l i < 0 (by the global concavity ofû in l), then a small reduction in l i will increase both the patent-holder's and technology adopter's payoffs. Now, suppose that l 0 = l 1 . Consider a small change of royalties, (dl 0 , dl 1 ), that keeps the constraint satisfied:
The impact of these changes on the objective function is:
where ∂û ∂l = ê + l ∂ê ∂l v and ∂v ∂l = −êv.
When both l 0 and l 1 are in the interval (0, l * ] ⊂ (0, 1) but l 0 = l 1 , say, l 0 < l 1 , then
Therefore when ξ(l) is strictly monotonic in l in this range, whenever l 0 = l 1 , there is a pair of feasible changes (dl 0 , dl 1 ) that can increase the value of the objective function.
It can't be optimal.
If some element, say, l 0 hits the boundary point 0, i.e., l 0 = 0 < l 1 ≤ l * , then
thus a feasible pair of changes that will increase the patent-holder's payoff is dl 1 < 0 and dl 0 such that the constraint still holds. Q.E.D.
Proposition 6
Proof. First consider the case of ρ = 1, when technologies are perfect substitutes. The 
where ∂u i τ /∂r i < 0. Intuitively, a higher refinement by the other patentee will reduce the probability that the developer will use P i 's technology, ∂p i /∂r −i < 0. And so if the second term dominates, the optimal r i is increasing in r −i . We consider two cases according to whether r i ≥ r −i or r i < r −i .
When r i ≥ r −i and so V i ≥ V −i , the probability that P i 's technology will be used is In this case,
∂V −i ∂r −i = − ν 2 − ν 2 − 0dF (c i ) ∂V i ∂r i
∂V −i ∂r −i = 0, by uniform distribution. The expression (8) is strictly positive in this case.
When r i < r −i and so V i < V −i , the adoption probability is
The impacts of refinement efforts are
∂V −i ∂r −i < 0, and
< 0.
To pin down the sign of the expression (8), we need to consider both terms. With these terms in hand, By quadratic investment cost, V i = Ψ i (1 − α) 2v2 K/2 and u i τ = Λ i α(1 − α)v 2 K, and so
It follows that, when
the expression (8) For r i ≥ r > 1/2, r i (1 − r i ) is decreasing and r 3 i + (1 − r i ) 3 increasing in r i , and at r i = 1/2, the two terms are equal to 1/4. Therefore, when
or, equivalently, when α ≤ 1/2, the condition is guaranteed. And when α > 1/2, because α − (1 − α) 2 is increasing and α(1 − α) decreasing in α, given any r i this condition is more likely to hold when α is lower.
Next, suppose that ρ = 0 and the two technologies are perfect complements. The patentee P i 's payoff is U i =pū i τ − c R , wherē 2 , withV = (1 − α) 4v2 Ψ 1 Ψ 2 K/2. The payoff is thus
By the same token, the strategic property is determined by the sign of ∂ 2 U i /∂r −i ∂r i .
The relevant part is Ψ 2 i Ψ 2 −i Λ i (1 − α 2 Λ −i ). Note that for all r −i and α, 1 > α 2 Λ −i .
.
To have the optimal r i > r, it must be that
> 0, which in turn requires that 2αΛ i > (1 − α)Ψ i , and so α cannot be too small. Suppose this is true. The strategic relationship then hinges on
Refinement decisions are thus strategic complements.
B Later Adoption
In this appendix, we consider an alternative timing of technology adoption, i.e., at time 2.5, after learning the patent office decision, and check whether the results in Section 3 still hold in this late adoption scenario. We consider (i) the effect of a higher refinement effort on the overall probability that the developer will adopt the technology and successfully introduce the final product; and (ii) the patent-holder's incentive to engage in refinement. For simplicity, we assume that only ex post licensing is available.
After learning the patent office decision, and so the patent powerα, the developer will incur c f if and only ifv(α) > c f . The probability that the developer will adopt the technology and successfully enter the downstream market is F (v(α))ê(α). This probability is decreasing in patent power:
The second-order effect is:
Convexity can be obtained with more assumptions. Because ∂v/∂α < 0, dê/dα < 0, ∂ 2v /∂α 2 > 0, and d 2ê /dα 2 ≤ 0, we have strict convexity, d 2 F (v)ê/dα 2 > 0 if the terms F ′′ and d 2ê /dα 2 do not dominate. For instance, with quadratic form for c E and uniform distribution for F , both terms are equal to zero. For the rest of the analysis, we will assume strictly convexity. A higher refinement effort r thus increases the overall probability that the adopter will adopt the technology and successfully introduce the product.
For the patent-holder, given patent powerα, her expected payoff iŝ Let us consider the two special cases: π = u 10 , and π = v 11 and u 11 = u 10 = 0.
When π = u 10 , the patent-holder prefers to be the only player in the downstream market. Given patent powerα, her expected payoff isû = u 10 −(u 10 −u 11 )(1−α)F (v)ê.
the payoffû is strictly concave whenever F (v)ê is strictly convex inα. Assuming the latter, the patent-holder has no incentives to engage in any refinement effort when she aims to monopolize the technology use.
Next, consider if the patent-holder is a pure licensor, i.e., π = v 11 and u 11 = u 10 = 0.
In this case,û = F (v)êαv 11 , and
To determine the curvature ofû, let us consider the special case of quadratic cost c E = e 2 /2K and uniform distribution F (v) = νv.
Given these functional forms, 
